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NABSTRACT
This thesis proposes that there are many problems
withlwith public housing today and that many of them
stem from poor management procedures that are not in the
best interests of the tenants of public housing.
This thesis therefore provides a model plan for imp-
roved management procedures, especially allowing more
tenant participation in the management and decision
making of the public housing authorities.
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Public housing for the poor people in our country
that cannot afford their own homes on the private market
has long been an important part of the government's
fight to end poverty. It was designed to meet the needs
of the most unfortunate of our people, the ones that
were not reachedfy the governments'other efforts to help
families own or rent homes. It has not succeeded nearly
as well as its early sponsors had hoped, however, for a
varity of reasons: First it has been cut back considerably
from the number of units these sponsors had proposed
for it, which has reduced the number of people it can
reach, making it less effective. Then the projects that
have been built have not been as successful as supporters
would have wished either. The families there have been
dissatisfied with the physical condition, of the projects,
the social atmosphere there, and with the rules and
regulations imposed on them.
Instead of becoming a stepping stone on the way to
success of telmporarily poor people it has become a haven
for permanently poor and misfits of our society, and not
a very beneficial home for these people either. Some
critics today are saying that the projects actually are
fostering the conditions of crime, lack of initiative.
among the people, lack of respect for their homes and for
the rights or others, and even ugly, poorly maintained
housing that they were supposed to eliminate. These
critics are not the usual attackers of public housing
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either. Many of them are people who were and still are
ac'tive supporters of the program and are most sympathetic
to its problems. Many of these critics are in fact residents
of public housing. This would seem to indicate that the
program does have problems that need solving.
The problems that involve the local authorities and
im particular management procedures seem to be the problems
most immediate to the public housing tenants and also the
most easily solved. At least they are the problems that
can be solved at the local level or else through action of
the department or Housing and Urban Development, which
should be more responsive to the needs of the poor than
congress could be with its varied interests that it must
satisfy. If there are problems in the management of public
housing that are making public housing less beneficial
to its tenants than it could be and should be then these
problems should be remedied as quickly as possible because
the program is dedicated to helping the poor and if it is
not succeeding in that the program must be considered a
failure. If the intention of the publi housing program
is to supply "a decent home and a suitable living environment
for every 'American family" then it must live up to those
ideals to be considered a success. 1
'This paper then. is a study of one local authority
(the Quincy Housing Authority)" in depth and a study of the
literature on public housing in general to determine
whe-ther there are aspects of public housing management
6.
That need improvement to make them truly beneficial to
their tenants. If there are such problems , the paper will
then propose changes in policy to remedy the situation.
After these proposals for change there will be discussions
of these problems and solutions and possible alternative
solutions will be discussed.
To help understand these problems there will also
be a brief history of public housing and its management
tracing its evolution and particularly the development
ot its suspected problems.
Most of the problems came to be considered problems
because of complaints of the tenants which is not an unbiased
group, certainly, but on the other hand they are the people
for whom public housing is intended and their dissatisfac-
tion must be taken as agood sign that the program is not
being completely successful. Thus a study of these
problems is necessary and programs for improvements is these.
problem areas are definitely needed.
History
With the first national housing act of 1937 and even
before, public housing in the United States has been surroun-
ded by controversy. The idea that the government should
provide "decent, safe and sanitary dwellings for families
of low incomet was not then and is not now -universally
2accepted. There had been some unsuccessful attempts to
start such a program before then, but they had been
defeated by the bitter opposition of most private house-
builders, landlords and real estate agents(National Assoc.
of% Real Estate Boards), savings and loan managers (United
States Savings and Loan League), and. many private
citizens not in need of such housing, who resented the
idea of having to subsidize the poor with their taxes, and
many people who just were against any and all government
intervention in a formerly private sector of the economy.3
The supporters (Public Housing Conference); reformers and
politicians who felt the government should look after its-
poor and unfortunate, the city governments which saw a
chance to remove their blighting slums, the homebuilders
who saw a chance to receive some government money, and of
course the poor themselves; had tried unsuccessfully to get
the legislation passed for several years.
It took the depression of the 1930's to finally
make the program acceptable to a majority of congress.
In 1937 the number of unemployed and poor people had
been greatly increased by the addition of many former mid-
7.
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dle class and other. "temporarily" poor people. These
people added impetus to the idea of public housing by
more than just sheer numbers. These "temporarily" poor
people were often people who had been well respected
members of their communities, educated, articulate,
influential, and much easier for the average voter to
identify with than the poor of the pre-depression years.
These submerged middle classes, as they were called,
were 'the friends, neighbors or relatives of the more
fortunate majority of voters and this made it easy for
the voters, who had possibly come close to financial
hardships themselves to feel a need to help these people
who were temporarily down on their luck. These temporarily
poor people themselves were also more able and willing to
press the case for public housing -than any class of poor
before them. These factors all combined to make a public
housing program much easier for the voters to accept
At the same time, previous opponents to the bill were not
putting up their usual opposition. The depression-era
homebuilding, construction, and building supply industries
were suffering from a great lack of business. The federal
government was about the only source of money for new
construction available at the time and its entry into the
housing market was actually welcomed by these groups as
long as it was restrained from over-supplying the market.5
This restraint was built into the wording of the Wagner-
Steagall Act that stipulated that the number of units built
9could not exceed the number- of units destroyed by urban
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renewal and slum clearance. The anti-socialism and anti-
governmental interventionists were not as vocal in their
opposition as they had been either, probably because of
the changes in the general economic situation and in public
opinion, which now favored most government programs that
might help provide jobs and give people more money to spend.7
In fact the 1937 Act had a preamble specifically stating
a purpose or "reduction of unemployment and stimulation
of business activityti. 8
With all of this favorable support the housing bill
was final.y enacted with a general feeling of opimimism.
In the beginning this feeling seemed justified because
the rents charged in the public housing, although low were
generally high enough to keep out the real problem poor
families, who were intentionally avoided in this way in
favor of the submerged middle classes, and there were
few real problems between the local authority management
and the tenants. In fact the atmosphere was an informal
and friendly one with rents collected by young female
social workers and students, so called "rent girls"
who offered help and advice while collecting the rent.9
These days were ended permanently by the war, however.
For it brought with it the need for housing for workers
directly involved with national defense which was given
priority over public housing for the poor and many of the
10.
units originally intended for the poor were switched to
defense housing only three years after the passage of the
Wagner-Steagall Act.
The end of the war in 1945 did not bring any return
to housing normalcy, however, for the emphasis of the public
housing program was then switched to housing for the large
numbers of returning veterans who were unable to find
housing. This lack of housing was due to the decreased
unemployment and increased wages resulting from:the war
which enabled many people to buy housing who had been unable
to afford it during the depression and also the freeze on
private house building during the war which transformed
the housing surplus of the 30's into a housing shortage
during and after the war.10
The government efforts to prevent the prosperity of
the war years from fading rapidly into: another depression
by subsidizing new construction were generally directed
towards these returning veterans and the now resurfacing
middle classes, with housing for the poor being temporarily
negle cted. Without the spokesmanship and support of the
previously submerged middle classes the pressure for public
housing for the poor was greatly reduced and it was only
natural that the government switch its emphasis to the more
vocal veterans and middle classes, which also were the
groups that the public was most sympathetic towards and
the groups which could supply some money of their own
11.
towards this new housing. This last factor removed the
image of charity normally associated with government
subsidized housing and therefore made the program univer-
sally acceptable to the public, realtors, bankers, builders,
and other groups opposed to public housing for the poor.
At the same time the proponents of public housing could
hardly object to homes for veterans and the same middle
classes they had been working for in the past. It also
was a much more economical program from the government's
and the taxpayer's viewpoints since less money was needed
to subsidize housing -or these groups with some money -of
,their own to invest in housing than to subsidize housing
for the very poor who had no funds to contribute. In fact
the federal mortgage insurance program of the Federal
Housing Administration actually erided up making money, so
few were the foreclosures and so faithfully did the new
homeowners pay their insurance premiums.
With all this government support and money going to
the veterans and middle classes, however, there was little
left for public housing. Also the numbers of "good" families
left to live in the ",projects" had decreased considerably.
Most of the veterans, defense workers and submerged middle
classes previously living there were either taking
advantage of the government's subsidies for private housimg
in the suburbs and moving out, or were being evicted by
the local authorities for becoming over-income. 12  Over-
income meaning that their incomes had 'increased until it
12.
was above the upper income limits for continued occupancy.
With the economy prospering as it was, most of these
educated and mobile poor did become overincome and left
but the uneducated, permanent poor were largely left
behind. Thus in the late 40?s and 50's the character of
the public housing projects changed from that of a temporary
stopover for the submerged middle classes and veterans,
to the present so called .permanent poor" -- the unhirables,
the unskilled, blacks, and the "problem families".
This change reduced support for the public housing
program greatly for at least three reasons: It increased
the undesirability of living near.a public housing proje:ct,
because of its less "desirable" residents; It eroded
public sympathy for these needy people because they are
not seen as being the same kind of people as the general
voting public; Finally it increased the problems of
public housing management, which is the main subject of
this paper.
Even while this change was occurring, however, the
second major housing act(the Taft-Ellender-Wagner act) was
passed by congress in 1949.13 It passed by the narrowest
of margins and only after bitter opposition by people
who made up the NAREB, USSLL, National Association of Home-
builders, U.S. Chambers of Commerce, Mortgage Bankers
Association, National Apartment Owners Assoc., Producers
Council, several building material manufacturers and
subcontractors and by local conmmunities after the passage
14
of the bill.
The supporters of the bill were the National Assoc.
of Housing and Redevelopment Officials, the AFL-CIO,
National Assoc. of parents and Teachers, American Council
on Human Rights, Church groups, other civil rights groups,
League of Women Voters, Veterans groups such as the American
Legion, the National Assoc. of Consumers, and with the
National Public Housing Conferende(later the National
Housing Conference) also in communities acting as a co-or-
dinator. There were also related groups in local communities
such as groups representating better homes or slum clearance.1 5
In fact the major reason for the passage of the bill
was that it contained provisions for"housing production
and related .community development sufficient to remedy the
serious housing shortage'? and a provision for "eliminating
substandard and other inadequate housing " and for the
clearance of slums and blighted areas, all to be accomplished
16
by various aids to private housing companies. It can be
seen that this was probably the main selling point of the
bill by the fact that it was never questioned while the
issue of public housing itselfthe provision to build
810,000 units by 1955 was almost defeated entirely three
times and this provisiont s greatest margin of victory
was only five votes.
After the 'passage of this bill it appeared that major
Public Housing programs were finally going to go into
13.
effect, but again a war broke out and set the program
back. This time it was the Korean War in 1950 that forced
the government to cut back the program to provide more
money and materials for the war effort, and to hold down
inflation. The yearly proposed number of units to be
built was approximately 135,000(it was allowed to vary
from 50,000 to 200,000 units a year as long as the
810,000 total was reached in six years.18 But Congress
appropriated only enough money for 30,000 units in 1950
50,000 in 1951 and similarly small totals for all the
years up to 1960 with the result that by 1960 less than
25% of the housing that was to have been built by 1955
19had been built. The number of units being built since
and funded since then has increased considerably since
1960, but the program is still recovering from its many
setbacks.
The strong opposition in Washington is only part of
the question, however, and for the purposes of this paper
not the most important ones. There was also strong oppo!.
sition to public housing on ;the local level" In fact even
with the decreased appropriation the figures show that at
least 20% of the units for which there were funds available
20were not applied for by local authorities. When a
community rejects federal money there must undoubtedly be
very strong opposition to the subsidized program in
the community. Some of this opposition was probably
organized by the real estate and other such interested
parties, but they needed an already present strong base
of resistance to build upon. Most of this opposition stems
from the change in tenants and the associated reasons for
decreased popularity given earlier. Most people in the
local communities felt little obligation to take care of
their "problem families" and certainly didn't want to
live near them. The tenants were seen as "riff-rafft",
crooks, vandals, and people with little initiative to
get a job or better themselves, whose presence would
surely lower property values. They also had very dim views
of the projects thenselves. ;They were often pictured as
ugly high-rises, with broken windows, rats and bugs,
obscenites on its walls and the stench of urine in its halls.
Even if they didn't picture the projects quite this
badly, they certainly did not have a very favorable picture
of the projects judging from the unfavorable reaction
expressed by most communities when the possibility of
locating a project in their neighborhood was brought up.21
One of the most effective campaign techniques used for
defeating public housing in local elections was to merely
suggest to the voters that the project could be located
22
near them. There is some evidence that this attitude
is changing considering that even with the greatly increased
numbers of units funded in the last few years there are
applications from iocal communities to the Department
of Housing and Urban Development for all of these units and
more. Applications from local authorities were coming in
15.
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at a rate of 140,000 units per year in 1968. Local
referenda on public housing had produced negative results
in 40 out of 60 cases between 1949 and 1952, but in the
190 cases since then only about 60 have produced negative
24
results.
This does not indicate a complete change of public
opinion on public housing for the poor , however, for there
have been changes in the program over the years that have
made at least some aspects of the program more accept-
able to the public. Most notable of which was the addition
of housing for the elderly. In 1956 unmarried elderly
were first allowed into public housing but not until
1961 did the government actually make additional subsidies
explicitly available to public housing for elderly to allow
local authorities to house these people and still operate
in the black.A small word of description of the local
authority. When a community decides to have public housing
project in their town they will set up a local authority
to handle the project and make reports to the Dept. of
Housing and Urban Development. This is a necessary step
to get federal money. The local authority then operates
under HUD rules but has a great degree of freedom in its
operation within these rules. The control that HUD does
mAintain over the authorities is mainly monetary and
since they require the authorities to supply financial
statements every year and make explanations of any
irregularitaries or extensive losses the authorities have
had during the year. This makes the authorities keep
in mind the desires of their tenants, their general public,
the rules of the federal government, and state government
in some cases, and also worry about trying to break even
financially.) Since this law concerning the elderly
was -nacted this has been a most popular form of public
housing (in 1964 52.6% of all new units put under contract
were specifically for the elderly).26This housing appeals
to the authorities for several reasons.besides the extra
money. Elderly are very orderly families that will not
create trouble, they are easily associated with by the
voters which avoids a lot of trouble in site selection
and referenda if they are necessary, and they are the
closest thing left to the submerged middle class in their
values and habits and the fact that their unfortunate
circumstances can be seen as true unavoidable misfortunes
rather than a case of laziness.
So this special form of housing has undoubtedly cont-
ributed greatly to the programt s successful showing
recently in the referenda. In fact housing for the
elderly in the only form of public housing that has been
successful and in some cases it is the only form that the
authorities themselves will even try to get money for.
Whether or not public housing for the poor inr eneral
has become much more popular, is still unclear then, but
it seems to be receiving less opposition from its old foes
17.
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and less opposition in the local communities. It is still
not universally acceptable, however. As a matter of fact
it has come under strong attacks from a different group
in recent years. This time it is its traditional supporters
who are expressing misgivings about the program. The very
people who fought hardest for the program in the past; the
liberal reformers, the labor unions, the authority
managements, and perhaps most impor tantly, the tenants
themselves are now dissatisfied with the program.
There were harsh attacks launched by former avid
such
supportersvas Catherine Bauer, Michael Harrington, Lawrence
Friedman, Nathan Glazer and others against the drab
ugliness of the buildings and the terrible social conditions
in the proj-cts, sometimes, such as Pruitt Igoe in-
St. Louis, they have even described as the worst slum in
27
the city. The tenants staged rent strikes to protest
the bad conditions of their projects in again St. Louis and
also Syracuse, and less extreme forms of protest such
as verbal or written attacks on public housing by
residents and managers from a variety of projects throughout
the country.28
This surprising and disturbing fact that could mean
the program has failed to adequately serve those for
whom it was originally intended and this is what is
prompting this study.
There are many possible reasons for this rising dis-
satisfaction within this group in the face of public
housing's broader acceptance, but the area of problems
probably most curable, and certainly most immediate to
the tenants would seem to be the area of public housing
management by the local authorities. So this seeming
reversal of roles on public housing and especially this
particular possible reason for it shall be the topic
of this paper.
19.
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Public Housing Mianagement
The evolution of the management of public housing
projects has already been touched upon, but deserves
closer attention if it is a major reason for the change
in attitudes of its original supporters.
The first projects--aroundl937-- were generally low
rise row houses that fitin quite well with the private
houses of the area, often being low in density and
suburban in character.29 A typical project was about 75%
gardens, forests, lawns, and recreation areas. The manage-
ment was casual in form, generally informal and very much
like a private landlord-tenant relationship.
The tenants were the submerged middle classes that,
although unfortunate, worked hard and paid their rents
well, generally had rising incomes that often permitted
them to buy their own home within ten years of moving there. 3 0
These people were often well educated, well behaved, etc.,
and management reflected this behavior by not imposing
harsh regulations or enforcing rules unnecessarily. 3 1
With the change in tenants resulting from the war and
its aftermath which caused the voluntary and involuntary
withdrawal of this temporarily poor class of people from
the projects duetooverly increased incomes, the project
began to serve the permanently poor instead. This brought
in the problems of fatherless families, juvenile delin-
quents, poor rent payers, and all other sorts of problems
21.
that tended to follow these people. Not to mention the
problems of being black, truly poor, having large families,
and often being ignorant of middle class sanitation and
housekeeping norms. 32
This situation also tended to be self- perpetuating
because this influx of "problem families" made the
submerged middle class residents all the more anxious to
leave generally to be replaced by the permanently poor who
had not benefitted from the general rise in standard of
living after the war as had the temporarily poor. There
were no strict national rules about minimum incomes for
projects but as authorities had to be able to justify
their losses to the federal government as I have said
they tended to screen out applicants who were deemed inca-
pable of paying the rent regularly.32 After 1949, however,
when the loss of the more stable elements from public
housing combined with the seeming intention of the 1949
act , which was to reach lower income families including
those on relief, forced the projects to accept these
lower income families and those families with irregular
incomes, When this happened the projects had to accept the
problem families that came with these permanently poor
families. 3 3 Also in 1954 legislation was passed making
housing of people displaced through urban renewal and
slum clearance a prime concern of public housing.3 This
also reduced the screening ability of the local authorities
who now had to accept all these relocated families that
applied.
To counteract the problems of rowdy, ofte n illegitimate
and or fatherless families, often with criminal record, or
drug and alcohol records, often prostitutes, or just plain
troublemaking and damage causing families; the projects
switched from their loose informal rules structure to a
verystrict, formalized, impersonal authoritarian one. 35
Most of these changes took place between 1949 and 1953 and
helped to give public housing a generally bad image, that
later events have not disspelled. This has resulted in
the projects' generally bad image with its tenants, pros-
pective tenants the general-public, and the authority
management. For any of these groups to have these
attitudes is bad but for the managers to have an attitude
like this could only succeed in making matters worse.
Surely most project managers view their tenants with respect
but there have been many reports from tenants that claim
the management looks down on them as inferior and one
poll of the board of commissioners of one authority revealed
that: There was no need for more public housing in the area,
that the authorities needed more strict rules to control
the tenants and better means to enforce these rules, that
the authorities should not recognize tenants groups, and
finally that most public housing tenants have no initiative.36
This is obviously an isolated study, but that these attitudes
should exist in any managerial group is not a promising
2 3
s ign.
The attempts of the public housing boards to stop
this change in character of the projectst tenants by
enforcing more strict rules, have not been successful and
may in fact have made matters worse.. Many of the more
stable elements in the projects these rules and the manage-
ment's method's of enforcing them, and the many inspections.
and moved out to avoid them. People of the West End district
of Boston, for instance, who are fairly typical "respectable"
poor, when an urban renewal project moved them and gave
them a chance to move into public housing, only 1/6 of those
eligible for public housing bothered to apply, even
though they were living in crowded slums at the time.
The ones who did *not apply all thought that the housing
projects would offer them a worse housing situation
than they enjoyed then. They feared not only loss of free-
dom but also that the projects would be more crowded and
run down than their present slum. This shows how bad
the image of public housing is or else the quality of
projects these people had seen in Boston. Despite this
almost all major cities, including Boston , have wating
lists to get into public housing because they have more
applicants than they can handle, so this negative idea of
public housing must not be as bad as the reality of many
people's housing at present. This means the authorities
must be doing something right. There is still a possibility
that the image of the rules and poor physical conditions
24
may be keeping certain'classes of people(probably the more
stable ones) out of public housing.
These problems and changes have tended to shift the
whole attitude and therefore policies of the boards
from one of being a helping hand to the temporarily
poor on their road back to one of being a caretaker for
the chronic poor mainly keeping them isolated from the
general public life of the city.
The lease imposed on the public housing tenants by
the management often containS two to three times the
restrictions found in a private lease drawn between land-
38
lords and tenants. These leases also tend to be enforced
rigidly and uncompromisingly. For instance, a case often
mentioned in public housing literature is that of a blind
New Orleans man who had to go to court to: be allowed to
keep his seeing eye dog in the project, because of the
39
projects ban on pets. Although cases such as this
are very rare, ther are less extreme cases of overly-
strict regulations on holding parties, for having
overnight guests, and often frequent invasions of privacy
40
for inspections The fact that the lease itself is
almost invariably a one month lease is another inconvenience
that there is no real reason for, especially in the case
of elderly persons whose incomes are obviously not going
to change'.
With these rules and regulations, or possibly with
25.
them just being enforced for the first time after 1949,
there grew increased annoyance and rebellion by the
tenants that resulted in a rise in tenant organizations and
activism.k1 These tenant organizations were not new to
public housing. They had existed in the earliest days of
public housing when there were educated individuals in
the projects who had some knowledge of the law or
organizations, but these organizations had faded out with
the loss of their leadership class.42
Another cause of a lack of leadership besides the
loss of the submerged middle class was the-fact that many
authorities evicted "activists" tenants as troublemakers
at the first sign of activity and also because of the
Gwinn amendment allowing authorities to evict subversive
tenants for their refusal to sign loyalty oaths, on
the grounds of "annoyance". This latter probably had
little real effect because it was passed during the
Mc Carthy days and it is doubtful that there were many
communist organizers in public housing at the time. It
could have been used to scare people out of trying to
organize any tenant's group, however.
General purpose tenant organizations are again appearing
as have ad hoc groups organized around specific issues in
management of the projects. There have been several rent
stri"kes such as I have already mentioned and other lesser
indications of organization in,, if not real tenant organi-
26.
zations in almost every authority throughout the :ountry.
There are now tenants magazines of a state wide nature
and possibly a nation wide nature that list dozens of
project and. authority wide groups in Massachusetts alone.
The tenants are increasingly expressing a desire for at
least a say in the governing of their projects and
usually a more active part in it including some decision
making power or some power of review of the board's
decisions that affect them. The authorities have responded
differently in different parts of the country depending
on the strength of the protest, the attitudes of the
managers, and the measure of sympathy for the cause of the
tenants that is found among the citizens of the immediate
44
area. In recent years the federal and state govern-
ments have begun suggesting guidelines for the handling
of these problems and in thenext few years there may even
be a more or less uniform policy governing the main
areas of complaints that tenants have. It is to this end
that the following study was proposed and this paper writ-
ten.
27
Survey Project
The purpose of this paper was to produce a model
management policy for public housing authorities
across the state to make. their operation more equitable
and beneficial to their tenants assuming they were not
already so. It drew much information from'a study by the
Joint Center for Urban Studies of Harvard and MIT. This
study was designed to study the actual operating procedures
of public housing authorities as opposed to the handbook
or suggested guidelines. Its purpose was to conbine all
this. information and make it available 'to the public
in general and community organizations, tenant organizations,
legal services groups, and public housing authorities in
particular so that these groups can be made aware of what
ia happening elsewhere in the state and compare it to
the local management procedures. It is assumed that there
would be differences in procedures among projects with
advantages and disadvantages accrueing to these methods.
It is also the intention of this study to eventually
use this data to try to put together some form of kniform
policy covering every aspect of behavior of public
housing management. The idea is that the differences among
authorities may be due to lack of ccmmunication and this
collection of data and model policy might be of great
benefit to all concerned.
The group conducting the study was made up of one legal
services representative, one Harvard PhD., one community
28.
organization representative and several Harvard students
doing the research for a paper. The main concern of
this group was the handling of tenants and their rights
by management. The survey and questionnaire pertained to
the expected areas of most concern to the tenants such
as admissions policies, evictions, rents, leases, and tenant
participation. These were the areas of complaint most men-
tioned in tenant journals and other articles concerning
-tenants. so it was assumed that they would be the major
issues here also.
All of this data is not collected at this writing so
it is not possible to examine and report on specific
policies of the authorities throughout Massachusetts. This
paper has instead based the following. model policy plan
and discussion of it on a study of present state, federal,
and local housing authority policies and a study fof major
complaints of involved parties and some of the solutions
proposed by various groups. This information was found
through reading the available literature. Also used was
an in depth study of one particular housing authority
through personal interviews and readings of their printed
material such as annual reports and leases.
This sample is not large enough enough to draw
conclusions about what is being done in local authorities
outside of the one I visited with any degree of validity.
It will also limit the applicability of my model plan
considerably, but it shoud remain valid for the sample of
29
authorities that I studied. Judging from the authorities
that I studied it seems like there are only a limited
number of problems that an authority is likely to have
and these are the ones this study is aimed at. These may
not be problems at all authorities, but this should not
hurt the applicability of the model plan to those areas
where these same problems exist. It is the problems that
the-proposals center around and not the projects, even
though much of the form of the problem and solution comes
from the particular projects studied.
Following is a brief description of Quincy and its
public housing authority and the data about procedures
and problems that was obtained there.
The Quincy Housing Authority (QHA1)
Quincy is a predominantly white, mainly middle class
town with a substantial working class population of recent
imiigrants from Dorchester, 'South Boston and other sections
of Boston, and a few much richer residents living in
its suburbs. The city is extremely homogeneous racially
with less than six black families out of a total popu-
lation of about 90,000, despite the fact that it is close
to a large metropolitan area with many black families, and
also despite the fact that many blacks work in a factory
in Quincy. How it has managed to stay this way is
difficult to understand considering the large numbers
of fairly inexpensive houses there. It is possible, and
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was suggested to us more than once that there is a very
subtle segregation procedure that discourages blacks from
buying homes, but no one could offer any more concrete
ideas than that by way of explanation.
It has a fairly large housing authority with slightly
more than 4,000 people living in 1470 units, but it does
serve a larger area than Quincy itself; the towns of German-
town and Scituate are also served by the QHA. There are
no blacks in the housing authority, which is quite under-
standable. About 50% of the people are elderly, with half
of the units being federally funded units specifically
designated for elderly persons. The other units are state
aided and designed for thepoor with preference given
to veterans. One of the smaller units is occupied entirely
by veterans but most of the other .buildings have only
a .small number of veterans although no numbers are readily
available. The units range in age from 1 year to ten years,
with most of them being close to ten years old. They are
generally low, about three stories and the individual
buildings probably contain less than fifty people, except
for the newest biilding whichest is the only high rise.
It is about twelve stories tall and probably contains
around one hundred people. The projects are located in
two separated locations each of which is in a very nice
section, blends in very well with its surroundings and is
very pleasing physically all around.
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The local authority management changed five years /\co
when its former manager was replaced with its present
manager, an ex FBI man appointed by the mayor. The cons-"
ensus of the three people we talked to who were tenants
or primarily concerned with the tenants welfare, was that
the new manager was much more cooperative than the old
one. The new manager also seemed to be growing more will-
ing to delegate more authority to the tenants as time
goes on, but he needs to be pushed into any concessions.
The local board of commissioners is composed of per,
sons appointed by the mayor also; all are white collar
businessmen and lawyers. They-yare much less receptive
to the demands of the residents than the manager is, which
is unfortunate because they have all the actual power
in the authority. They decide all evictions and discip-
line cases, in closed executive session, and have the
final say in all major policy decisions.
The biggest controversy concerning the local housing
authority at the time we were studying Q uincy, was that
the/nayor had just created new jobs in the authority and
given them to his brother in law and private secretary
and intended to take one himself when he retired. Other
members of the board are all close friends of the mayor
with one other being his other brother in law and one
his law partner. The furor over these appointments caused
the new jobs to be tabled for a while while more consider-
ation is given-them. The other main complaint of the head.
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of the tenants' organization, was that this board has absol-
ute power over the authority with the tenants having only
the right to express their ideas but no official power to
affect decisions, and almost no informal power given them
either. The usual procedure is for the tenants' group to
make a recommendation on evictions or whatever the issue
is at hand, and then the board goes into executive session
and makes a decision that is then announced to the tenants.
On evictions the board will usually go along with the
tenants but on other decisionssuch as the new board posi-
tions, or the question of appointing a tenant to the
board the commisioners have done what they liked regard-
less of the feelings of the tenants.
The major reason for choosing Quincy for study
was one of convevience: the study was intended to look at
as many authorities as possible and therefore it touched
those closest to Cambridge. There were no special reasons
for selecting it for this paper since I had no previous
knowledge of the city or its authority, but it seemed
fairly typical. In fact, Quincy is far from typical in
terms of its completely homogeneous racial character and
the newness and excellent. physical condition of the project,
but the problems of the tenants seemed very similar to
those described in articles concerning other projects in
other cities. Their complaint of lack of power is easily
the most commonly mentioned in any reports of other
authorities. The problem with the political appointments
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to the board of commissioners was far worse than anything
I had heard of but the problem is quite common for small
towns. In all other respects it was typical of
authorities in medium sized non-urban area.
The tenants' organization is a city wide group that
as mentioned before is mainly a go-between' for the tenants
and the management and the board of commissioners with some
control over smal3/roblems and decisions that are primarily
inter-tenant matters. Other than that its functions are
strictly advisory. The head of this group said the biggest
problems not already mentioned were getting the authorities
to hire tenants for summer jobs and other temporary or
secretarial work instead of hiring outsiders for the jobs
There was also a Community Action Program (CAP)
that is concerned with problems of all the poor in the
city instead of just the public housing residents. It
does much of its work with the tenants, however, and is
very concerned with their problems. The head of this
group was actually more concerned about the lack of
power of the tenants than the tenants ' organization was.
He also expressed a desire for a legal counsel that could
be available to the tenants and these two organizations
and thought that the board's executive sessions might be
illegal. He saw more power and actual control for the
tenants' -organization as the key to the tenants getting
any other concessions from the authority.
34
The concern of the board seems to be to avoid any s
scandals or serious trouble from the tenants, while trying
to make as few changes as possible, and keeping as much
power for themselves as possible. The jobs seem to be used
solely for political favors and the men appointed seem to
be trying to insure that the jobs keep the-same level of
power( and salary) that they now enjoy. The head of the
CAP thought that the tenant selection was mucti abused for
patronage reasons, and if this is so this would be another
stronger explanation why the board members are so loathe
to relinquish any of their control. The head of the CAP
seemed quite radical and some, of his accusations seemed
totally unsupported so it is impossible to' say how much
weight to attach to his theory. The CAP seemed to be con-
nected 'to the Office of Economic Opportunity, but this
i-s not certain.
The tenants' organization head also seemed not to fully
agree with the CAP people in CAPts views of the authority
management and commissioners. The tenants had a more
sympathetic view and thought the management people were
quite cooperative, while the CAP thought they were just
acting. This could be due to a difference in personalities
but could also be due to the fact that the tenant had got-
ten into the projects and was being allowed to stay even
though she had been over-income for quite a few months.
This could easily tend to make her look more sympathetically
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on the authority's management practices. The CAP
chairman, on the other hand, had to look out for the inter-
ests of all the people including the ones tha t have not
gotten into public housing so it is logical that he
would be more critical of the tenant selection process
than someone who only represented people who had already
gotten in.
The management also had troubles in Quincy. Their
problems were financial in nature. They had not gotten
the federal grants they needed and they were losing money
on rents under the so-called Brooke Amendment whith will
not allow a family to pay more than 25% of their income
for rent. The difference is supposed to be made up by
the federal government but the director of the QHA said
that it buried them in paper work and the delays in getting
money could be quite long. He also expressed concern over
The Department of Housing and Urban Development's model
lease and their guidelines encouraging tenant participa-
tion. He said these things could make his load of paper-
work to get anything done completely overwhelming.
We did not get to talk to any members of the Quincy
housing board.
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Model Policy
This model policy is intended to benefit the tenant
of public housing much more than any other pqrty involved
in public housing, but the benefits to the tenants have
been weighed against the costs to the other groups. Most
of the ideas for the policies have come from the tenants
or advocacy groups working in their behalf. These
policies are an attempt to pick the workable parts out
of the proposals of these tenants groups and find
workable programs to handle what seem to be the major
problems of the tenants of Quincy and the major problems
for all public housing authorities.
Many of these ideas are not new and many in fact
are in effect in some places or are supposed to be in effect
.at least in state(Miassachusetts),federal or on some local
level.
It is obviously almost impossible to formulate one
universal policy acceptable to all groups such as tenants;
local management, housing board members, and prospective
or rejected tenants(not to mention the taxpayers who must
pay for these projects) involved in any project or to
fit one policy to all projects unless it is tremendously
flexible.. For these reasons there is a discussion of
each main feature of the plan immediately afterwards
along with possible alternatives that could be equally
Justified. The proposals are separated into areas of
operation, such as -admissions, evictions, tenant partici-
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pation and tenant organization to make them easier to follow.
Admissions
The main complaint from Quincy concerning admissions
was that the procedure was very arbitrary and entirely
up to the management. This came about because the author-
ity has a zero vacancy rate with a long waiting list and
very little turnover in tenants. It turns out(according
to the head of QHA) that vacancies occur so rarely that
almost every time they do there is some emergency case that
has to be considered ahead of all those on its waiting
list. It is obviously necessary to -have provisions for
handling emergency cases, but this special consideration
could easily be abused if there are no controls over this
power. This is what the head of the CAP thought was hap-
pening in Quincy, with political patronage a key force in
tenant selection with the friends of the mayor or the
other members of the Authority's heirarchy, getting the
vacant apartments. It is not possible for us to determine
if this is the case or not, but it is easily conceivable
that it could happen in such a case as Quincy is. To
prevent the possibility of this happening, or to eliminate
the possibility of anyone charging that this happening
there shouldbe some controls on this power.
1. To guard against these abuses or possible abuses there
should be a formalized system for dealing with these
emergency cases on the basis of family size, condition of
present housing, and other extenuating circumstances such
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as natural disasters. It almost goes without saying that
"first come first serve" be the basis for honoring
applications for housing. Unless the situation was a true
emergency the selection should be made of the' person at
the top of this time ordered list.
This would probably not be enough to stop unfair
selecting processes in most cases, however so some form
of review by some unbiased board would be necessary to pre-
vent any unfair or arbitrary behavior in selecting tenants
or ordering them on the list. Summarizing these points:
1. There should be a formalized method of ranking appli-
cations with extenuating circumstances on the same waiting
list with the regular applicants, but would be given a
certain amount of priority.
2. There should be a review board to impartially
review these cases to insure honesty.
A. Aossible form for this board would be to have
an equal number of tenants elected by tenants, and an
equal number of Housing board members elected by the
board members, with one unbiased member elected by
these previously elected board of review members.
Like any proposed action this one has advantages and dis-
advantages. These are summarized below:
PROS , CONS
This procedure for sel- This would addmore delay
ection by setting up pri- - and paperwork to an already
orities and sticking to a inefficient system.
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waiting list that already . Quincy may be an isolated
included extenuating circum-.city as far as this problem
stances in its ordering, ,.or the possibility of this
would make for a fairer sys-.problem goes. The liter-
tem with less chance for .ature on public housing man-
patronage or bias. .agemen pays little attention
It would also give prospecto the problems of patronage
tive tenants a better idea of.and apparently it is not con-
where they actually stand on. sidered much of a problem in
being admitted and allow them.most authorities.
to plan more effectively. . A review board of the
It would probably result .form proposed would have
in better integration of fam interests as concerned
ilies throughout thr author-, with preserving the status
ities if they gave the first. quo as the present man-
vacancy to the first family , agement would be, and
on the waiting list. might not be an effectual
review.
The setting of priorities
within the waiting list could be
as arbitrary as the present sit-
-uation and could tend to promote
exclusion of whole classes of
.people if abused.
This idea is obviously not without its drawbacks. It
would be more fair to prospective tenants and reduce
patronage if handled correctly, but this is often not a
serious problem(patronage) . If it is not a method such
as this would only create more work and the odds of getting
a good management that would handle the selection fairly
are almost as good as finding a review that would handle
them fairly. With any reasonable type of -contro],'on it,,
however, the abuses of this proposed system should be
very small and if there were a review board of the type
suggested it should not prove very burdensome or much of
a waste of time. If bias and patronage were not considered
a major problem in an authority it would probably be
better not to bother with this review board, because it
would only complicate the procedure needlessly.. Only if
there were complaints or a strong possibility of mistreat-
ment of the "emergency" classification as there appears
to be in Quincy. In these circumstances such as the one
in Quincy such a procedure is necessary, however. If
a waiting list is considered useful for public housing
then it should be followed and used and not merely side-
stepped continuously. This procedure of a systemized list
and a review board would .make the waiting list a meaning-
"ful thing that prospective tenants could plan by.
This procedure should allow less maneuvering of tenants
of one type into one project, or in other words should
promote more social integration which would seem to be a
necessary part of the"suitable living environment" men-
tioned before that the government intended to supply these
tenants. If the ghettoes need to be broken up they also
need to not just be resettled together in public housing,
and a faithful sticking to a waiting list shpuld prevent
that.
If the project is to operate for the best benefit of
the tenants, then at some point their judgement must
be accepted along with the project director's, and they
must work together in running the authorities, and this
includes the admission procedure. As long as there is
still a formalized waiting list system there is little
chance for a clique to take over the selection process
and convert the projects into totally homogeneous units.
One other possible area of improvement is the area of
admissions would be to broaden the spectrum of incomes
allowable in the projects. This would again promote more
social integration and variety in the projects and intro-
duce elements into public housing that are now excluded,
but are still unable to afford decent housing on the
private market. This was not considered a problem in
Quincy, but could be in other places or to other groups
that we did not get a chance to talk to precisely because
they were excluded from public housing.
2. There should be broader moreplexible income limits
extended up, and down if still necessary.( There should be
no exclusion of any people because they cannot afford
public housing rents, but if there are still places that
are dong this they should be stopped)
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PRO CON
S 0 *0 0 0000 *0000*0* 0  ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0** 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0*0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
The greater variety of income. Allowing h ighe r inc ome
ranges and hopefully people .families into public hous-
would allow more social int-.ing would cause, exclusion of
egration, which seems advis-.some families who might be
able for breaking up the :needier and less able to
ghetto and ghetto mentality..afford decent housing.
It would make public . Public housing is gener-
housing se:ve all of those .ally already way over sub-
for whom it is needed and .scribed. There is not
intended. .enough room now and more
It would help supply bet-:applicants would only make
ter role models for poorer .matters worse and lengthen
public housing residents and.waiting lists.
help give them initiative
for self-improvement.
If there are some people who are being overlooked
for public housing because they are too poor to afford rents
and not eligible for welfare, this policy would benefit
them most. Hopefully there are no such cases now with
the Brooke amendment and other changes in public
housing policy.
The provision for allowing highe.r income people into
public housing would probably be beneficial to the projects
as a whole, but is probably unfair to the then excluded
poorer families. The provision for allowing families
whose incomes rise above the normal limit for maximum
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income , to stay anyway, which will come later in this
study, seems more effective in providing role models
for the poorer families to copy. That policy would show
the poorer families a family that had come into the project
as poor as they had and then had prospered,bettered them-
selves, and who were not being punished for this improve-
ment with eviction. The family that comes in better off
may be a more stable force for the projects,,but won't
have the. effect of showing the poorer families how they
can better themselves, because they will have been that
well off from the beginning. The stabling influence
would be a benefit to the authorities by itself that
should not be overlooked. If the provision for allowing
over-income families to stay were to be accepted this one
would be unnecessary as far as providing role models
and stabling influences are considered.
The only other consideration for the measure would
be whether these pre-sently excluded upper-lower income
people could find decent housing on their own. Undoubtedly
there are people who cannot afford a house or apartment
on the open market, who are still not eligible for
public housing because even the maximum rents allowable in
public housing projects(not including rents for over-income
families) are by definition lowei' than private rents for
decent housing of comparable size. And yet maximum limits
for eligibility now are always set some percentage below
the income needed to purchase adequate private housing in
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the area. This automatically leaves out some people whose
incomes fall somewhere in between these numbers needed for
public housing or private housing. Many of these people
are reached by other government programs but this is
another way to reach these families that could possibly
be of benefit to the other families living in public.
housing. There is also the extra feature that these fami-
lies could pay higher rents takingsome of the loss u
that the poorest families cause the projects to incur.
This would make the jobs of the managers that much easier
by removing some of their worries about losing too much
money. Also if the present projects could be made to be
less of a financial loss this could very well make the
projects more popular with the public and with private
developers interested in the turnkey projects whereby
a private developer builds and runs the project for a time
and then turn them over to the local authority for either
a limited profit or no profit. In other words more
financially successful projects that could be made possible
by these higher rent paying families could result in more
projects getting built because they would be more appealing.
This would be doubly true if these families provided the
stability that would be expected of them, and could erase
the rowdy riff raff image of public housing projects.
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Continued Occupancy and Evictions
That keeping of over-income families that I have
just mentioned is probably one of the more debatable
aspects of public housing management at the present .time.
The issue has not been hotly debated but it has produced
divided opinions by housing experts, public housing
managers, and tenants. The main question is whether these
good "role models" that families who have worked to become
over-income (having their incomes rise above the maximum
upper limit for continued occupancy in public housing)
present are worth the loss of space that could other-
wise go to needier families. This is by no means an easy
question to answer and it is especially hard to quantify
exactly how ov-:er-income a fanily should be allowed to
become and still stay and then for how long?
This issue was not of very great importance in Quincy
because the tenants, management, and community action people
all seemed to agree that these over-income families should
should be allowed to stay because they were beneficial to
the projects. Apparently noone had been evected for being
over-income in at least the last year or two even though
many families had become eligible to be evicted for that
reason. The usual practice seems to be that these over-
income families write a statement showing that they could
not get any adequate housing that they could afford and
then take it to the notary public ir the authority to get
it notarized and then they can stay as long as they like I
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and everyone in the project is happy. The prospective
tenants that are forced to wait for openings may have
a very different opinion, however. These tenants that do
become over-income are of worth to the other tenants, though
as is witnessed by the fact that the president of the
tenantst organization was a woman who had been over--
income for months and had not even bothered to turn
in the letter stating that she could not find any decent
adequate housing that she could afford. It appears that
these over-income, more fortunate, skilled or educated
fmilies may be assuming the place of the departed middle
classes of the old public housing days. They may become
.the able spokesmen and organizers of the public housing
projects and may eventually be able to build support for
the issue of public housing the way the former spokesmen
of the submerged middle classes did. At least they may be
able to get more respect and rights for the tenants from
the local management and boards of commissioners.
3. Local Authorities should be given more liberty
to keep over-income families, especially if they cannot
find suitable, safe, standard housing they can afford.
They should also be allowed to stay for either a certain
length of time or until their incomes reach a certain
- limit regardless of the availability of adequate housing
that they can afford, if the local authorities deem it
necessary to keep these stable, high initiative, and of
course, good role model families around for the good of
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the authority.
PROSP... .... ... ...... ..... .. . ....... CO0NS.............*S S
It would provide.needed . The places held by over-
role models for poorer and .income families could better
younger tenants to aspire to.be used by poorer, needier
It would remove the pres-.families.
ent penalty for working . Local project managers might
hard and raising the famil- .tend to take advantage of this
les income. .rule and keep all their
It would provide added .overincome families until
revenue and stability to .the projects became essentially
the projects, and probably .a middle class, moderate
more able and active lead- .income project.
ership for the tenants.
0 .......... 00 0a 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 * 0~ *~ ~ 0 0 ~~ 0 0 00 0 0 0 *
The main question seems to be not the worth or
advisability of keeping over-income families, but rather
what limits shou'd be placed upon this policy. Almost
all involved parties in most authorities and especially
Quincy seem to feel that some successful families are
needed and that it is unfair to immediately eject these
families just. for displaying the very- attributes the
program is supposed to help build in its tenants. The
debate .comes in when the sctual munbers such as level of
over-income to be allowed; number of over-income families
to be allowed; and length of. time they should be allowed
to stay have to be considered.
48
If rents are increased. directly with the rate of inc-
ome increase over-income families will generally move
out voluntarily as soon as they can afford private hous-
ing as cheaply as their present public housing, unless
they have developed real roots there. Private housing is
more private, more unregulated and allows freedom to move
or locate where you wish with whatever people you wish, so
it has proven in the past to be preferable to public
housing if rents are the same.
The only reason most over-income families stay at
present, besides sentiment for their homes, is that it is
very hard to find suitable housing elsewhere at any where
near the same cost. One survey of persons displaced from
a pro ject showed that 80% of all displaced families who
were removed for being over-income- paid more for their
new housing, but that between 1/3 and 2/3 of them were
living in substandard homes.5 This would seem to indicate
a discrepency between present estimates of adequate
income to afford private housing on the open market and
the actual income needed for such housing. If such a dis-
crepency exists then the income levels for continued
occupancy should be raised accordingly, as well as the
eligibility limits that have already been discussed. Of
these two increased limits, the one for continued occupancy
seems most important and should be raised first or else
highest. This would allow for a family to raise its income
without having to suffer the punishment of being uprooted
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and forced to pay higher rents for quite possibly worse
housing.It would seem better to deny something to someone
in the first place than to give it to them for a short-
while and at the first sign of self-improvement, take it
away from them. Also maintaining the lower limits for
eligibility, however, would insure that the program
still reached the very poor that are below the reach of
other government assistance programs for housing.. Without
some form of incentives, or at least a lack of punishments,
the program runs a great risk of losing all its ability
to help poor people improve their lives, and could cause
the program to end up the permanent home fpr these
permanently poor families that it may very well be helping
to- create. This is one view of public housing's purpose
but it is the one that has created the most hostility
and disappointment in the program.
The social benefits of keeping some number of over-
income families seem quite clear and valid, but what are
the costs? If the total number of such over-income famil-
ies in any authority is kept quite small, as it should be,
to be most effective, and as it probably would be naturally
if rents were raised equitably with income, given the
natural aversion to any institutionalized style of life
with less freedom than private housing could offer, and
also considering most families natural desire for their
own home. Assuming then that this number of families that
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stayed on would be small the costs would also be small.
The number of families waiting for admission to public
housing throughout the country must be an enormous number
compared to the/small number of openings that forcing these
over-income families out would create,if Quincy is any
measure of the typical authority. The reading would indi-
cate that in this respect anyway it is quite close to nor-
mal.
In Quincy thereis a waiting list of a total of
1800 families fb'r the 1480 units, and assuming that only
half of the units are occupied by elderly, whose incomes
are presumed not torise above the income limits,(this is
the minimum number of units that can be occupied by elderly
since half the units are specifically designated for
the elderly), this would leave only 700 units that could
be vacated by families becoming over-come. Assuming that
about ten percent of these units actually could be vac-
ated in/his manner, which was one tenant's estimate of
the very maximum number of non-elderly families that could
become over-income in a time span of about five years;
this would vacate 70 units for 1800 families in five years.
This number would be very significant to one of the famil-
ies that could be occupying one of these units, but this
increase in available units would do little for the total
housing situation for the poor in Quincy.
More good could be probably done by leaving these
families in the authority. Besides their role as good
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models for the poorer residents, there are the benefits
already mentioned of increased stability for the .projects,
increased leadership, organization, and an,.ncreased ability
forbhe tenants to make themselves heard and gain respec-
tability, which could lead to larger improvements in
the tenants' condition. later. Then again there is the
possibility of financial benefits to the projects that
could do more good than anything else.
Finally there/is the possibility that the good influence
of these tenants will have its desired effect and help
other poor families to better themselves and therefore
leave the authorities, creating open spaces that could
be filled by the waiting tenants.
The major responsibility in determining the number of
these over-income families kept and the limits on their
ablility to stay should lie with thetlocal authorities and
their tenants, but should/be largely dependent on the avail-
ability of good housing in the area. The authorities
should be able to decide if they needed these models and
how many they did need, but these decisions should again
not be arbitrary, but rather based on actual needs of the
authority and its tenants.
The ideal form then would be the most flexible pos-
sible tp make the program suitable to the different projects,
however, this is assuming that the system would not be -
abused. This could easily be an unjustified assumption
because the management and tenants are going to be most
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anxious to keep these stable and desirable elements and
might tend to keep too many of them for too long a time,
depriving many needy people of housing without providing
their tenants anyknore real benefit. This is why it
might be necessary for limits on the amount of time
a family could stay or on the amount of money over
the maximum limit they could earn to prevent abuses of
this program. A limit on length of occupancy would be
advisable when there is readily available housing in the
area that people who are only slightly overincome could
afford, and the limit on the extent their incomes were over
the limits should be used where housing in very scarce and
considerably higher incomes than the maximum allowable are
required to purchase decent housing.
The other major area of concern in Quincy and to an even
greater extent in other areas judging from the literature
is the area of tenant participationn eviction decisions
andother areas of tenant participation in making decisions
affecting their lives and the projects.
The Quincy tenants' representative complained that
they had no say at all in the governing of the projects,
or at least what they said had no effect at all on the
policies decided upon, but could only discuss and advise.
This seemed to be the most common complaint of public hous-
ing tenants and seemed to irritate them the most. It is a
part of almost all complaints of tenants that they have
been left out of the policy forming process even when they
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agree with the decision reached. The tenants of Quincy
expressed the belief that this lack of participation was
a major factor problem behind all their other problems.
The head of the tenants' group said that just to be able
to talk with the management and know that they would
listen and genuinely consider their proposals would make
many of the other frictions between the tenants arld
the authority management seem far less important..
The feeling of having the ability to influence the impor-
tant decisions to be made concerning the project would
probably have an effect on the feeling of responsibility
the tenants have for the project that might be as benefi-
cialto their well being as any concrete decisions they
might actually make.
4. The proposals for change in the area of tenant parti-
cipation would be simply to include the tenants in the
decision making process on all major decisions concerning
the authority.This should include some significant repre-
sentation(hopefuly equal to the management's) on the review
boards reviewing tenant selection, eviction, and all disc-
ipline cases. It also shouldinclude some real voting power
on policy formation or changes that will affect the tenants.
These review boards cover the main areas of operation
in the authorities that the tenants are most closely conc-
erned with and are the areas where the tenants and manage-
ment are most likely to have disagreements. For this
reason tenant participation in these decisions could elim-
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nate a lot of bad feelings that might originate in
decisions by the management that the tenants did not agree
with because they would be equally responsible f or the
decision, or they could change some of the decisions that
management would have made that the tenants would have
disagreed with. Since the tenants are also very much con-
cerned with any major policy decisionswhich will after
all affect them more than anyone,. they shoud definitely
have some voting power in making any of these decisions.
One possible form for this board of review that
has been used in several authorities, apparently with suc-
cess, is one composed of equal numbers of tenants and
board of housing commissioners members each group selected
by the group from which they come, and then one additional
outside member selected by these other elected board of
review members.
In Quincy in particular, a major step forward in
decision making policy until the day a tenant can be one
of the housing commissioners,would be to have thectual
decision making part of the board meetings open to the
public instead of holding them in a secret executive ses-
sion.
The pros and cons of this issue are fairly subjective,
and are mainly ones of degree of participation advisable
since any one will agree that the tenants should have the
right to at least discuss all decisions and help make
at least some minor decisions.
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The major arguments against increased tenant partici-
pation are that it will make the operation of the authority
very slow and- difficult if the tenants have to be con-
sulted on a. lot of policy changes and if too many of
the decisions of the authority are subject to review. It
will'also undermine the power of the authority, which could
lead to a breakdown of discipline and a subsequent increase
in the degree of difficulty of running the authority
smoothly. The only other reason cited against increased
tenant participation is that the tenants are not intel-
ligent and capable enough to govern themselves, or even
help some in governing themselves.
Increasing tenant participation,from the tenant's
point of view,would result in increased feelings of respon-
sibiliity for the project and pr ide in theproject and them-
selves. It would most importantly give the tenants
power to make decisions concerning their lives and their
homes. The projects exist only for the benefit of the
poor people that they house and therefore should be as
responsive as possible to the wishes of its tenants.
The projects should work to improve the condition of the
lives of its residents as well as just providing shelter
for them. The social atmosphere of the projects is just
as important, if no more so , as the physical environment
provided the tenants of public housing. Not only should
the tenants be given as much power as possible to shape
their environment so it would be most.suited to their needs
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which they are best suited to judge, but a good start
towards a good social environment would *be the feelings of
self-rule and responsibility that goes with the decision
making power.
Another benefit of this increased responsibility
for their own governance would be that it might make the
projects more attractive to to the more stable, intelligent,
and proud families who shunned the program when they thought
they would be giving up their independence to live there.
If the authority manager and board of commissioners
accep the/fact thet their job is to help these people
get back into the/main stream of American life and help
raise them out of the poverty andrghetto mentality" that
they are presently in; or if the authority feels that it
has the job of taking care of these "permanently poor"
and making their lives as comfortable as is reasonably
possible; thsn the authorities should bring' the- tenants as
much as possible into the governance of the authority as
soon as possible for all the benefits listed above.
If on the other hand these authorities look upon
their jobs as being to act as caretaker to these poor
people and to just keep an eye on them and keep them
away from the rest of the community's citizens, while
keeping them out of trouble and reasonably satisfied;
then the authority's reluctance to grant the poor people
there any control over the authority is logical and justi-
fied.
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There is also the possibility that the authorities
see their jobs as being only to provide a safe, decent home.
for these people and that is all. In this case also the
logic against tenant participation would be justified and
correct. This last view probably plays a dominant role
in the thinking of most housing officials -and is the reason
they do not want to sacrifice efficiency for the benefit
of their residents. The only benefit they are concerned
with providing is the house they live in, and any more
concerns would decrease the number of families that they
could provide housing for.
This last view is understandable, but to really help
the poor they must be given the necessary social
atmosphere that goes along with the physical one. Any less
will just perpetuate the problem of having poor people to
house. Also the-tenants today are reaching the stage where
they will demand more control and will not merely accept
a shelter that gives them no independence or-any of the
other factors of human life that are just as important as
having "decent, safe and sanitary dwellings for families
of low income". The originators and builders of public
housing realized this in 1949, which is why they
changed the intent of the program to one of supplying
Ia decent home and a suitable living environment
for every American family".( my emphasis)
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Conclusion
As can be seen from the discussion of the model
policy proposals therekre no clear cut definite rules for
managing such complex problems as are found in public hous-
ing.Only the area of tenant participation seems to clearly
callfor a specific action of increased participation for the
residents giving them as much control as possible, hopefully
putting them on an equal footing with the housing board on
decision-making.
The other proposals are seen as beneficial overallbut
each should really depend on the conditions of the local
authority to determine whether it is needed or not and to
what extent the proposals should be followed. Methods of
review are necessary if something is not being done equitably
but are just a cumbersome bother if they are not needed.
The best solution would be to implement the tenant
participation segment of this plan as soon as possible and
to as great an extent as possible. This is the most impor-
tant portion of the plan and the one that seems to be uni-
versally applicable. This would solve most of the major
problems that tenants have in receiving as much benefit f rom
the authorities as possible, as well as giving them the
most immediate benefits through increased pride and sense
of responsibility. Also from this any other parts of this
model policy that are felt needed can then be established
with the increased power and responsibility for their own
governance that this step will give them. From here
the tenants should know what to do if my assumptions are
correct.
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